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THE OFFER OF AN ACT FOR A PROMISE
The term "unilateral contract" is frequently used in an undesirable
sense to mean that there is no contract at all, either because there has
been no acceptance of the offer or because there is no consideration
for the promise to be enforced.' It should be used only where the
agreement of the two parties has created a single duty and not mutual
duties, with a single correlative right in the opposite party and not
mutual rights. The term has been subjected to some criticism, 2 a
criticism that is mainly due to a failure to distinguish between physical
facts, and the jural relations of persons caused by such facts. There
cannot be "unilateral twins" sagely remarks Mr. Ewart, not observ-
'Morrow v. Southern Ex. Co. (1897) ioI Ga. 81o, 28 S. E. 998; Ziehm v.
Frank Steil B. Co. (917) 131 Md. 582, 102 AtI. o5; Meade v. Poppenberg
(915) 167 App. Div. 411, 153 N. Y. Supp. 182. See Corbin, 'Offer and Accept-
ance and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
173; I Williston, Contracts (i92o) sec. 13.
'See the review of Anson on Contract (Am. ed. by Corbin, i919) in 33
HARV. L. REv. 626.
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• See the revie of nson on ontract ( . ed. r i , 1919) i
HARV. L. Ev. 626.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
ing that where twins exist as a fact it is quite possible for twin A
to be under a duty to twin B in the absence of any duty whatever on
the part of twin B to twin A.
The single duty existing in the case of a unilateral contract may
rest either upon the offeree or upon the offeror, the correlative right
being of course in the opposite party. In other words, the offer may
confer a power on the offeree to create, by his subsequent voluntary
act, either a duty on himself or a duty on the offeror. The latter is
far the more frequent.3
Of the former Professor Williston says :4 "Even when the offeror
in terms offers an act of his own in exchange for a promise to be made
by the offeree, the words of the offer are necessarily promissory, for
the offeror must in the nature of the case, announce that he will do
a certain act in the future, in return for a promise to be made to him.
Indeed an offer which requests from the offeree a promise vill, when
accepted, always ripen into a bilateral rather than a unilateral con-
tract, except in one narrow class of cases; namely, where the very
giving of the promise by the offeree also has the effect of completing
the act promised by the offeror. The only instance of this sort that
can be supposed arises where the offeror offers (that is, promises)
to transfer title to personal property on receiving a specified promise
from the offeree."
This language is open to objection. It is inaccurate to say that
"the offeror must, in the nature of the case, announce that he will
do a certain act in the future" ;5 for, as -the author himself says in
the next sentence, in some cases "the very giving of the promise
by the offeree also has the effect of completing the act promised by
the offeror." This makes it perfectly clear that the only act left to
be done is the act of the offeree. In such case there is in fact no
promise of any sort by the offeror, no "undertaking to do something
in the future." An offer of title to personal property in return for
a promise by the offeree is not a "promise to transfer." It creates
not a duty in the offeror but a pbwer in the offeree. The only operative
act still to take place" is an act of the offeree, the making of the
requested promise.7 After making his offer, the offeror may go
peacefully to sleep, confident that title to his chattel will pass to the
offeree upon the latter's acceptance.8
'See illustrations given in (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 173.
4 i Williston, op. cit., sec. 25.
"It is not safe to trust to the "nature of the case." This often means, as
here, that the writer has chosen his own major premise and then assumes
that it is infallibly and exclusively the true one. The assumption may here
be due to the author's having defined a contract as "a promise or set of
promises." Ibid., sec. i.
aI Williston, op. cit., sec. 24.
'See Mactier v. Frith (183o, N. Y.) 6 Wend. 1o3; Y. B. 17 Edw. 4, 2.
* It seems not improbable that the courts will in the future hold acceptance
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COMMENTS
That the illustration in the passage quoted above is not the "only
instance of this sort" may be observed from a study of Suter v.
Farmers' Fertilizer Company (1919, Ohio) 126 N. E. 304. The plain-
tiff was a broker who had negotiated with the Aetna Explosives Com-
pany on behalf of the defendant, the result of the negotiation being
that the defendant contracted with the Aetna Company to supply it
with six hundred tons of sulphuric acid per month for twelve months
at twenty-seven dollars per ton, specifically promising the Aetna
Company in that contract to pay Suter, the broker, a commission of
one per cent, "said brokerage to be paid as payments of the price
were received by the defendant." After'a few small deliveries had
been made, on which the commission was paid to the plaintiff, the
Aetna Company got into financial difficulties; it agreed with the
defendant to rescind the contract for acid and paid to the defendant
the sum of $45,000 as consideration. The court held that the defend-
ant was bound to pay the plaintiff the agreed commission on the agreed
purchase price of the entire amount of acid and not merely on the
$45,0o0 received.
In this case the defendant denied that it had ever employed the
plaintiff as broker, although there was some evidence to the contrary.
The court rightly found it unnecessary to determine this question,
for the plaintiff had in fact offered his services to the defendant,
for pay, the latter had already received the benefit of these services
in that a willing buyer was now at hand, and he now expressly
promised a third party to pay for them. The contract thus made was
unilateral, the services of the plaintiff being fully performed prior
to the making of the express promise by the defendant. No duty
ever rested on the plaintiff, but a duty to pay now rests on the defend-
ant.9 This case therefore clearly suggests the possibility -of an offer
of executed service for a return promise. A broker may without
request on the part of the principal find and bring him a willing
to be operative, even though the offeror is dead and no longer capable of acting.
See German Civil Code, sec. 153.
'It is not within the scope of this comment; but the court seems to be quite
right in holding that the defendant's agreed duty was to pay one per cent
on the full contract price, and that the express condition precedent of payment
by the Aetna Company was nullified by the fact that the defendant, by voluntary
rescission, itself prevented the fulfillment of the condition. The defendant
does not allege that the Aetna Company was insolvent. One cannot escap'e a
duty by voluntarily preventing the fulfillment of a condition .precedent to such
duty by a third party; and such prevention does not cease to be voluntary
merely because it seems that sound business policy requires it. See Camden
v. Jarrett (1907) 83 C. C. A. 492, 154 Fed. 788; Brackett v. Knowlton (1912)
io9 Me. 43, 82 Atl. 436; Loehr v. Dickson (igio) 141 Wis. 332, 124 N. W. 293;
Rumsey v. Livers (igio) 12 Md. 546, 77 Atl. 295; Weinberg v. Shulman
(913) 53 Pa. Sup. Ct. 64; Dupont Powder Co. v. Schlottman (914, C. C. A.
2d) 218 Fed. 353; Colvin v. Post Mtge. & Land Co. (1919) 225 N. Y. 51o,
122 N. E. 454.
53
HeinOnline -- 29 Yale L.J. 770 1919-1920

















l i tiff r r, lt t r i t t t .
l i
i
i t t illi r t , r l
t
il t l, t i f r
t t i f t r ss r is t f t. t
r r t t l i tiff, t t t t t -
9 t ' r
t
r t t t t i i l i i i illi
t r ti , t t r r r
r i il , . .
• It i t it i t t i t;
ri t i holding t at t e efe a t's r t s t r t
t f ll tr t ri , t t t r iti r t in t
by t e et a a as llifie t f t t t t f t, J t r
rescission, itself prevented the ° fulfill ent f t e c iti . f ant
s t ll t t t t i l t. t
t l tarily r ti g t f lfill t f iti . r t t
t t ir rt ; s r tion t t l l~ a
erel eca se it see s t t s si ss li r ir s it.
v. J rrett (1907) 83 . . . , e . ; r tt . lt ( 2)
log e. 43, 82 t!. 436; oehr v. icks (1910) 141 is. , . . 3;
Ru sey v. Livers (19IO) 112 d. 546, 77 t!. 295 ; einberg v. Shulmal~
(1913) . . t. ; t er . . l tt (1914, . . .
2d) 218 Fed. 353; olvin v. ost tge. and o. (1919) 225 . . 510,
122 . .45 -
YALE LAW JOURNAL
and able purchaser, informing the principal that he will expect a
commission if a sale is made. The broker's work is then all done and
he makes no promise. No doubt the principal can then make a sale to
the purchaser introduced by the broker without binding himself to
pay a commission. This is because the services have been thrust upon
him; he is privileged not to accept the offer and he is not disabled
from making a sale without accepting the offer.10 But the point is
that he has the power to accept the offer and to bind himself, this
power to be exercised by making the sale and by expressing assent
to the broker's proposal. In the case cited this is exactly what the
defendant did."'
The case is not substantially different where the broker has rendered
his service at the request of one who assumed without authority to
act as the agent of the principal, although in holding the principal
bound by his acceptance of the services the courts will now use the
language of agency; they will speak of his being bound by "ratifica-
tion." But this ratification is identical with the acceptance of an
offer; and on such ratification, the resulting contract is unilateral
exactly as above. The broker has made no promise and his services
are all done before the principal makes any promise. This may be a
case of past consideration; but if so we must make the best of it.
With respect to consideration these cases must be distinguished
from the offer of a conveyance of property in return for a promise,
referred to above. In neither case does the offeror make a promise
or offer to undertake a duty. In both cases the offeror confers a
power upon the offeree. But in the property case the exercise of the
power by the offeree,- the acceptance, will be detrimental to the offeror
and beneficial to the offeree, since it is the final operative act effecting
the conveyance of the property. This detriment and benefit are con-
temporaneous with the making 6f the offeree's promise, and so it
may be argued that the consideration is not past, even though the
acts of the offeror are all long since past. In the present case the
exercise of the power by the offeree is not detrimental to the offeror
(the promisee) or beneficial to the offeree (the promisor). By the act
of acceptance nothing is taken from the promisee or given to the
"0 Walton v. Clark (893) 54 Minn. 341, 56 N. W. 40; McVickar v. Roche
(1902) 74 App. Div. 397, 77 N. Y. Supp. 5o; Ballentine v. Mercer (19o8)
130 Mo. App. 6o5, 109 S. W. 1037.
'That the same decision might have been reached on some different ground
is obvious, but the decision should be supported as it stands. See in accord:
Edson v. Poppe (19o) 24 S. D. 466, 124 N. W. 44i; Muir v. Kane (igog)
55 Wash. 131, io4 Pac. 153; Spencer v. Potter (91) 85 Vt. i, 8o Atl. 821;
Boothe v. Fitzpatrick (1864) 36 Vt. 681; Ferguson v. Harris (1893) 39 S. C.
323, x7 S. E. 782; Anderson v. Best (1896) 176 Pa. 498, 35 Atl. I94. Contra:
Sharp v. Hoopes (i9o6) 74 N. J. L. I9i, 64 Atl. 989; Bagnole v. Madden
(9o8) 76 N. J. L. 255, 69 Atl. 967; Wulff v. Lindsay (i9o3) 8 Ariz. 168, 7i
Pac. 963. See also notes in 53 L. R. A. 373, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 526.
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COMMENTS
promisor. The only new legal relations created by acceptance are a
duty in the promisor and its correlative right in the promisee. These
are in every respect beneficial to the latter. The only possible con-
sideration for the promise, therefore, is the past action of the offeror
(promisee). This action was indeed detrimental to him and beneficial
to the offeree (promisor), but it lies in the past and at the time it
occurred it created no right or duty either contractual or quasi-
contractual.
The fact that the promisee has conferred an actual financial benefit
on the promisor may well be regarded as a sufficient cause or reason
for the enforcement of the express promise. The sale itself is not
being forced upon the promisor, and the existence of the definite
financial benefit takes the case out of the limbo of mere uncertain
ethical opinion. No doubt decisions of this kind rest upon some moral
obligation theory. So do all other past consideration cases. They do
not rest upon any theory of quasi-contract, for the reason that the
express promise of the defendant is held to be a necessary operative
fact determining the amount of the recovery. The judgment is for
the amount promised, not the amount of the value received and unjustly
retained by the defendant. 12
The doctrine that a moral obligation is a sufficient consideration
is supposed to have been "exploded," -but within limits it is far from
dead. The doctrine of consideration itself rests upon moral obliga-
tion in a broad sense. It rests upon the mores of society-those
approved rules, customs, and ideas that are generally believed to make
for general welfare. In individual disputes the doctrine becomes a
test of what the mores are and of the existence of social and moral
obligation. But it must always be remembered that the mores deter-
mine the doctrine and that the doctrine does not control the mores.
In no living and changing society can any legal rule or doctrine
remain unchanged. It is only by giving the doctrine of consideration
a continually new content that the doctrine itself can continue to live.
It seems clear that in this way the doctrine of consideration is
approaching the doctrine of causa in the Roman law.138 Societal con-
ditions in Roman and Continental life are not so different from those
of England, America, and the English colonies as to prevent a similar
development in law. It is the function of our courts to keep the
doctrines up to date with the mores by continual restatement and by
giving them a continually new content.1 4 This is judicial legislation,
"In Wright v. Farmer's Bank (1903) 31 Tex. Civ. App. 406, 72 S. W. io3,
the plaintiff voluntarily paid the defendant's debt, and a later promise to pay
was enforced. Here the amount is identical with the enrichment.
"
8See Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration (i919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 621.
"' This shows the futility of codification as an attempt at final crystallization
of the mores, though not as a means of careful and conservative legislation
to do away with some doubts and conflicts.
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and the judge legislates at his peril. Nevertheless, it is the necessity
and duty of such legislation that gives to judicial office its highest
honor; and no brave and honest judge shirks the duty or fears the
peril.
A. L. C.
THE CORPORATE ENTITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Two recent decisions of the British Privy Council, The Kronprinzes-
sin Cecilie (Part Cargo ex) (1919, P. C.) 119 L. T. R. 457 and The
Hamborn (i99, P. C.) ii L. T. R. 463 illustrate the vicissitudes of
the corporate entity theory in time of war. In the first case an
American corporation, The Vacuum Oil Company, shipped a cargo
of oil, f. o. b. on a German ship, to two of its subsidiary companies
organized in Germany and Austria, practically all of whose stock was
owned by the parent company in the United States. Notwithstanding
tfiis fact and an agreement by which the parent company undertook
to bear any loss by reason of the failure of the goods to reach the
subsidiary, the British prize court condemned the goods as "enemy
owned." In the second case, a Dutch vessel flying the Dutch flag had
been captured by a British cruiser on a voyage from New York to
Cuba. It appeared that the vessel was owned by a Dutch company.
The stock of this company was owned by two other Dutch companies,
A and B. The stock in company A was in turn owned partly by B
and partly by certain German companies, whose stockholders were
Germans. The stock in company B was owned by German companies
with German stockholders. The steamship was managed by two
Germans resident in Holland, but the court found that the "control"
of all the companies was exercised from Germany, and hence that
the Dutch corporation owning the vessel was really "enemy." Thus,
to achieve this result, three layers of corporate veil were stripped from
the vessel to disclose the human beings whose economic interests as
beneficial owners it was designed to reach.
In the Vacuum Oil case the real persons whose economic interests
were affected were American citizens, but the condemnation was made
in disregard of that fact because the consignee, though a subsidiary
of an American corporation, had been organized in an enemy country.'
In the Hamborn case, the vessel was owned by a neutral corporation,
but the persons whose economic interests would be affected by the
confiscation were Germans, encased in three coats of corporate forma-
tion. The conclusion would seem to follow that the prize court is
no slave to any theory, corporate or other, but will confiscate property
whenever belligerent interests seem to make it desirable and the
'On a previous occasion, the State Department had extended its protection
to the Vacuum Oil Co. of Austria against the Austrian government, because
its stockholders were principally American citizens.
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